



# Joint Urban Warrior 2009

Examining A Comprehensive Approach to Conflict Prevention



## Final Report

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Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory



# JUW09 FINAL REPORT

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“Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.”

- David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964)

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# Joint Urban Warrior 09 (JUW09) – Final Report

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## INTRODUCTION

JUW is co-sponsored by the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and is designed to address and improve joint and combined urban operations concept development and experimentation (CD&E). JUW involves service, joint, multinational, and interagency participation throughout the pathway. The JUW09 lead organizations for the USMC and USJFCOM were the Center for Irregular Warfare and the Joint Irregular Warfare Center, respectively.

The wargame was conducted from April 20-24, 2009 at the William F. Bolger Leadership Center in Potomac, Maryland. More than 200 participants represented all five services, as well as U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State (Bureau for African Affairs, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), think tanks, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 15 multinational partners. (See Appendix A for a complete list).

JUW09 examined issues associated with a whole of government approach to conflict prevention. Specifically, the game examined how each organization perceives its role, effective means of accomplishing whole of government objectives, and identifying gaps in supporting and executing a whole of government approach. In addition, JUW09 identified joint and service shortfalls in support of conflict prevention activities and the results offer improvements with regards to common assessment, campaign design, collaborative planning, training and advising, and preparation of the environment.

## OBJECTIVES

Reflecting a growing interest in irregular warfare (IW), J UW09 shifted its focus and objectives from combat in urbanized environments to the military's contributions to a more holistic approach to conflict prevention – involving the U.S. interagency community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational partners to address the problem:

**How will the joint force contribute to a  
Whole of Government Conflict Prevention approach?**

From this problem statement, the following game objectives were developed:

- Whole of Government Objectives (USMC Core Competency 6)
- Define Conflict Prevention
  - Identify how each organization perceives its role
  - Explore more effective means to accomplish Whole of Government objectives
    - o Assessment, collaboration, synchronization
  - Identify gaps that exist in supporting and executing a holistic approach to conflict prevention
    - o Utilize and disseminate planning frameworks
    - o Responsibilities of USG agencies
    - o Capabilities and capacities of USG agencies to accomplish assigned tasks
    - o Collaboration and integration

Identify joint and service shortfalls in supporting Conflict Prevention activities and offer improvements with regards to: (USMC Core Competency 1, 2, 5)

- Common assessment
- Campaign design
  - o Steady State Campaign Plan design
  - o Inform GCC Theater Campaign Plan assessment methodology
    - Examine indicators for one of AFRICOM's desired strategic effects
- Collaborative planning
- Training and advising
- Preparation of the environment
  - o Urban
  - o Understanding relevant population

## METHODOLOGY

### Simulation

J UW09 was designed as an information discovery game consisting of plenary, simulation and seminar elements. The intent of the simulation was to have subject matter experts and real-world

participants (supplemented with surrogates) play through the processes of assessment and planning in a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. Twenty-seven entities were represented in the simulation (see Appendix B). Each organization, country or agency had its own table, with the tables arranged facing each other in a circle. The auditorium provided military and civilian U.S. government personnel, NGOs and international participants a venue for exchanging ideas and collaboration.

The simulation was structured to identify points of collaboration and friction, which could be further analyzed and discussed in the seminar portion of the game. Participants in the simulation were instructed to play real-world constraints and processes as much as feasible within the limitations of the game. Overall, senior mentors and other expert participants deemed the high-level processes replicated during the simulation to be quite realistic and sufficiently valid for game discussion purposes. Analysts recorded general patterns of table interaction among game participants during both moves of the whole of government simulation (observations of their analyses and the data they compiled can be found in Appendix C).

### **ICAF**

JUW09 provided a vehicle for showcasing the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). ICAF is a tool that enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively, and supports U.S. government interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation and stabilization. In July 2007, the U.S. Government Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordination Committee (R&S PCC) authorized the ICAF as the interagency conflict assessment framework. However, ICAF is currently not in widespread use. JUW09 directed the players to use ICAF in the interest of focusing player activity and socializing this new tool. Players were not consulted on whether alternate models should be examined. Due to time constraints, players were not fully trained on how to conduct an interagency conflict assessment using the ICAF, and all the steps of the process were not followed in detail. Any insights on ICAF from JUW09 should be limited to general observations, since the game was never intended to rigorously experiment with the framework.

### **Scenario**

The simulation portion of JUW09 played a fictional 2015 Horn of Africa (HOA) regional scenario with transnational actors and a host of problems and potentials for conflict at the country and regional levels. JUW09 did not intend to identify or fix the problems in the Horn of Africa; the fictional HOA scenario was simply a vehicle for examining conflict prevention processes and issues.

### **Seminar**


After each simulation move, the participants were evenly divided into seven interdisciplinary seminar cells. Facilitators led each cell through a series of discussion questions crafted to focus analysis and synthesize discussion into insights to address game objectives. At the end of the game, each cell produced and briefed their recommendations.

## SIMULATION HIGHLIGHTS

### Move 1

Move 1 featured Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJIATF-HOA) and the U.S. country teams using the ICAF to conduct assessments of the affected region. The outputs of their assessments were predictably different based on their different perspectives of the affected region. In each case, the ICAF template required an examination of the following steps:

- Establish context
- Understand core grievances and sources of social/institutional resilience
- Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors
- Describe windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity



(For more on the ICAF, see page 13)

The CJIATF's assessment predictably remained conceptually based – describing the HOA region's mistrust of Western governments, the affected nations' insulted national pride, and the windows of vulnerability and opportunity for containing the situation in Eritrea. The country teams' assessments reflected the organizations' action-oriented posture – outlining tangible problems and near-term solutions along the lines of the diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) construct. Some of the drivers of conflict, for instance, were the need for infrastructure improvements and good governance promotion that aligned with the traditional mission of military civil affairs units.

### Move 2

The highlights of Move 2 included a meeting of the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC), an international donors conference for HOA and a basing disagreement involving Kenya. During the Principals Committee meeting, the members re-affirmed the President's guidance that any intervention in the region should be conducted in a multilateral manner. The principals also discussed strategies for peace-building, maritime security and counterterrorism. They also agreed to exhaust as many non-military options as possible before resorting to an armed intervention that could lead to major combat operations.

By most accounts, the donors conference was productive thanks to robust participation from potential members of the CJATF (multinationals, international organizations and NGOs). However, host nation representatives complained about Western governments' attempt to impose their agenda on host nation governments in exchange for humanitarian assistance. The Kenya basing disagreement underscored this disconnect. The Kenyan president voiced his strong protest at the end of Move 2, chiding outsiders for failing to consult the Kenyan government about establishing foreign military bases on its soil.

## MAIN EVENT KEYNOTE SPEAKERS SUMMARIES

### Monday

Dr. Reuben Brigety III  
Director, Sustainable  
Security Program, Center  
for American Progress  
*Convergence and  
Divergence in Conflict  
Prevention*

Professional warriors have come to understand that the conventional use of force has limited utility in achieving the strategic objectives of war. Simply having the best military to topple a regime does not necessarily achieve a desired endstate. Thus, conflict prevention and enduring stability are concepts that have garnered more attention as this realization has spread throughout the defense community. The diverse mix of military, diplomatic, developmental and non-governmental organizations highlights areas of convergence and divergence in the arena of conflict prevention.

#### Areas of Convergence

- Both warriors and peacemakers concern themselves with conflict and want to resolve conflict in a way that is durable and achieves various objectives.



- Both warriors and peacemakers are strategic in nature and in their thinking. This seems intuitive for the military, but more unusual for peacemakers. Peacemakers must think strategically to make the most of their precious little resources and find a way to use these resources to influence various portions of a given population.
- Both warriors and peacemakers understand the notion of concept and theory. Warriors know that mistakes in theory are paid for in blood on the battlefield. Peacemakers know that the best theories are meaningless if they fail to work on the ground.

#### Areas of Divergence

- Methodology: Warriors view conflict prevention through the prism of conflict – the actions necessary to compel an enemy to our will on the battlefield. Peacemakers are more concerned with dialogue. They believe that there are no conflicts that cannot be solved through dialogue and the study of culture.
- Client: Warriors are generally interested in serving a country, while peacemakers support a cause. This statement can generate much controversy. There are examples on both sides that do not fit neatly in this statement. However, warriors generally tend to approach conflict prevention as a means to support national interests. Peacemakers look to support a greater “peace.”

It is important to be audacious in our thinking, yet humble in our expectations. We have to be bold in who we bring to the table and what we ask them to contribute. These are problems that defy decisive victory, meaning we have to be humble in what we can hope to achieve in regards to the cessation of conflict.



#### Daniel Silverberg

Counsel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

*A Congressional Perspective on Whole of Government Activities*

Congress understands that the departments and agencies that make up the non-Department of Defense (DOD) portion of the U.S. “Whole of Government” are under-resourced. If the U.S. Government is serious about making a holistic interagency approach a reality, the DOD

must step back from traditional State Department roles and responsibilities. Over the past several years, the DOD has approached the Hill to lobby for changes in policies relating to laws and resources to assume Department of State (DOS) jobs.

For instance, the DOD has asked Congress to establish a counterinsurgency fund for Pakistan that would be managed through the Pentagon. The military’s rationale is that Pakistan is a war

zone in need of immediate assistance, and the DOD is best suited to take quick, decisive action in such an immediate exigency. By that logic, the Pentagon could build a case for militarization of U.S. diplomatic activities in any country in the world where there is conflict.

There is a strategic problem when the military takes a disproportionate role in dealing with the problem in Pakistan. The military's 1206 authority<sup>1</sup> was created to provide combatant commanders with the ability to sidestep jurisdictional hurdles to train and equip foreign militaries for foreign internal defense (FID) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, combatant commands have begun to try to use 1206 money on activities that have little to do with counterinsurgency operations.

The military's counter-argument has been that it genuinely wants to stop mission creep. If this is the goal, the DOD should support Congressional efforts to bolster the 150 Foreign Operations account,<sup>2</sup> make the U.S. foreign assistance strategy more transparent and coherent, and increase communication with Congress.

Lieutenant General John Sattler, USMC (Retired)

Former Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

Former Director, Joint Staff (J5), Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate

*Creating A 'Whole of World' Approach to Conflict Prevention*

As the first commander of CJTF-HOA and a former director of the Joint Staff Plans Directorate, LtGen Sattler was uniquely qualified to speak from 1) the perspective of a combined joint task force commander interfacing with an affected region struggling to harness existing U.S. diplomatic tools and 2) the point of view of a Pentagon planner who tried to resource the U.S. military's partnership building activities throughout the world.



The challenge boils down to a “whole of world” approach – harnessing the collective abilities of people that function in the defense, diplomatic and developmental communities worldwide. The goal is to operate in a way that does not treat the drivers and symptoms of conflict solely as a military operation.

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<sup>1</sup> Initially known as Section 1208 of Public Law 108-375, the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act granted Special Operations Forces the fiscal authority to train and equip foreign military forces; the law allows SOCOM to draw on its MFP funds for these activities, pending approval from the Secretary of Defense and notification of Congress. This partner-building capacity later fell under different sections of succeeding defense authorization bills.

<sup>2</sup> The 150 Account funds the civilian side of U.S. foreign engagement, including operating expenses at the State Department and USAID, public diplomacy programs and foreign assistance programs. Source: The Stimson Center, <http://www.stimson.org/budgeting/?SN=SB200902111948> (July 7, 2009).

Due to the diverse mix of backgrounds at JUW09, LtGen Sattler challenged participants to learn everything they could about people outside of their respective professional comfort zones.

“If you are on a staff you need to know what everybody else brings to the table,” Sattler said. “This is not just about sending an RFI (request for information) off somewhere. At the end of this week, you should know exactly who you go to and how you do it to get the right information directly, thus creating personal relationships. You have to make sure that when you get out there that we understand this environment. And we don’t. When you were a young officer you would ask the sergeant major, “What is that civilian doing in my battlespace?” and then I would get rid of them. Now we need to facilitate what these civilians can do. We have to figure out how we can get the maximum operational capacity out of the civilians who are out there operating with us.”

LtGen Sattler also emphasized a cross-cutting approach that breaks through the institutional U.S. interagency barriers. Bureaucratic structures are in place to facilitate the interagency concept at the national level (e.g. the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee and Policy Coordination Committees of the National Security Council) and field level (the U.S. country team). However, disconnects persist in the middle. A task force commander who wants to be effective must consult with the ambassadors of the affected region, and planners seeking to conduct a proper assessment must interface with their country team counterparts who will likely have deep knowledge of the issues in question.

“We roared in to see the first ambassador, but we didn’t go through the DOS Africa Bureau. We didn’t tell them what we were doing. It was almost as if we came to take over the country,” Sattler said. “We found problems that the ambassador didn’t necessarily see as problems. You can’t start coordinating when you get to the field – there needs to be transparency from the beginning. The country team should know your mission statement and what you are there to do, and the country team can tell the CJTF what the country team can do for them.”

## Tuesday

### Dr. Scott Moore

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

U.S. Department of Defense

*Building Partnerships*

Dr. Moore noted five strategic presumptions in the DOD’s efforts to build relationships with partner nations:

- Building effective partner security forces and institutions contributes to conflict prevention and stability.
- Effective partner security forces deter transnational terrorism from making regional inroads.
- Capable partners reduce the operational burden on U.S. forces.
- Capable partners can provide interoperable forces during US-led coalition operations.

- Partnership initiatives help “shape” conditions in areas of potential conflict.

There were a number of circumstances that affected the differing outcomes of these partnership activities. The U.S. succeeded when the partner nation perceived the threat as the U.S. did (Japan, Korea) and built a military in the American image – the partner nation’s forces were symmetric, interoperable and externally oriented. American partnership activities stumbled in places where the strategic objectives and threats were ill-defined – the partner nation’s forces were oriented toward asymmetric warfare, marginally interoperable and its threats were internal.

Dr. David Kilcullen

Counterinsurgency Adviser to former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

Counterinsurgency Adviser to Gen David Petraeus, 2007

*Initial Observations of JUW09*

In some cases, players conducted only a cursory assessment of the environment during Move 1 before quickly jumping into the planning phase of the ICAF. Because the environment is complex and confusing, spending adequate time to conduct a proper assessment is critical “and can save lives and dollars later.”



He also discussed the different perspectives that often impede planning among the developmental, defense and diplomatic communities – as members of each “D” search for the moral or intellectual flaw of the other party. Threat-focused analysis inevitably leads to the identification and fixation of an entity that can be categorized as the enemy – vice a counter-war strategy (advocated by French counterinsurgency theorist Loup Francart in his 1999 book *Maitriser La Violence: Une Option Strategique*) that treats the conflict itself as the enemy, rather than any one player.

Other observations:

- Players failed to consult host nation representatives about ongoing aid programs to the affected region.
- The U.S. must better understand 1) the limits of American influence, 2) the limits on the utility of force and 3) the full range of tools available, especially the non-military ones.
- Conventional planning constructs require an event or process to plan around. The focus could be the creation of a local security architecture or sustainable security rather than prevention. It is difficult to plan for what Kilcullen termed a “non-event.”

- Doing nothing should be considered as an option.

## Wednesday

### Larry Sampler

Principal Deputy Coordinator (Acting), Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

U.S. Department of State

*Comprehensive, Not Whole of Government*

Conflict prevention is an art, not a science. There is no real “whole of government,” which exists only in theory. “Whole of government” implies that while everyone has a seat at the table, there is no clear hierarchy or chain of command, no comprehension of command-and-control as understood in a military context and no unity of command.

The comprehensive approach is more modular – using assets within the government that are needed with no bureaucratic impediments – a comprehensive, collaborative approach. This also puts someone in charge empowered to make decisions to meet objectives regardless of inter-departmental squabbling and internal conflicts.

S/CRS was formed with high expectations and low resources, with a mandate to work in fragile, failing or failed states.

Watch lists can track variables that often lead to conflict, but this is effective in progressively failing states – not in states that are catastrophic failures. Analyzing these variables is also difficult, given the lack of consensus among different agencies’ watch lists.

Identifying key factors, variables and points of intervention are critical to successful conflict prevention. Successes are likewise difficult to measure – you cannot prove that a lack of conflict was directly linked to one’s actions.



## Thursday

### Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC

Deputy Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)

*Observations on Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa*

Col Davis recounted his experiences as a planner during the formation of CJTF-HOA and its initial year of operations in the Horn of Africa. He described the numerous factors that needed to be considered when planning operations in the region, including post-colonialism,

socioeconomic dynamic, geography, clan structure, sectarian divisions, past regional conflicts and host nation capacity for governance.

He also noted that the moment U.S. military personnel arrive in a region, they “take a side” in a conflict – whether the U.S. government realizes it or not.

#### Greg Bates

Director, Stability Operations Division, Foreign Service Institute  
*Integration and Transition*

Bates discussed the integration of civil-military operations as a critical element of unity of effort. DOD, DOS and USAID have done a better job of leveraging each other’s efforts when dealing with the needs of an affected region, but other elements of the USG, international community, NGOs and private sector also need to become involved. All parties must seek to overcome long-time barriers to better integration such as resource limitations and competing motivations.

## **INSIGHTS ON A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT PREVENTION**

### **Conflict Prevention and Interests**

Recognizing that any goal is partially defined by interests, the United States’ conflict prevention interests and goals are unclear. Currently, there is no doctrine to guide conflict prevention efforts in the DOD. U.S. Government efforts may intend to prevent violent conflict in cases where such conflict is perceived to threaten U.S. interests. In other cases, the U.S. seeks to manage a conflict in which U.S. interests (economic, security or otherwise) are perceived as either not threatened by or positively served by the conflict.

### **Nuances Between Conflict Prevention vs. Conflict Mitigation / Management**

Preventing violent conflict *per se* is not a general USG goal. U.S. interests will determine how and to what degree the USG will be involved in a potentially violent conflict. In some circumstances, the U.S. may determine that it would be better to manage the risk of conflict, or to act to mitigate the impact on U.S. interests if violent conflict should occur. At JUV09, players realized that comparing U.S. interests and perceived conflict impact was essential as a first step in determining if conflict prevention, conflict risk management or conflict impact mitigation were to be pursued. An initial conflict assessment should incorporate national interests in order to provide for an explicit linkage between interests and conflict prevention. Given that government conflict prevention efforts may be conflict risk management or conflict impact mitigation at their root, this stands in contrast with some other actors who will be present in the conflict zone. Many NGOs and international organizations (IOs) seek to prevent conflicts of any type.

### **Phased Approach Pre-Supposes Crisis**

Existing crisis response and military planning constructs are inappropriate for steady-state conflict prevention. An activist approach from an actor perceived as typically “crisis-oriented” may inadvertently drive the situation toward crisis. By getting involved, the USG could possibly

exacerbate the crisis it seeks to manage or prevent. The DOD's six-phase planning construct view of the environment is predisposed toward activating a contingency plan. In fact, a "Phase Zero/Shaping" approach to conflict prevention, mitigation or management could lead to perceptions which encourage actions that fundamentally differ from conflict prevention, risk management or impact mitigation goals. With this in mind, it is important to avoid confusing conflict prevention with contingency planning. USG planners should ensure "doing nothing" is included as an option. National-level defense planning scenarios should include a steady-state conflict prevention scenario, created in concert with U.S. country teams.

In particular, the common use of "endstate" during planning becomes conceptually problematic in any kind of steady-state conflict prevention situation. There is no end, since engagement is continuous.

### **Nomenclature – "Comprehensive" over "Whole of Government"**

The term "Whole of Government" is limiting, as it focuses attention on USG actors – excluding multinationals, NGOs and IOs. A "comprehensive" approach is a preferable and more descriptive term, capable of including coalition partners, regional powers, host nations, NGOs, IOs and others. The concept of a "comprehensive" approach satisfies game objectives by providing a more effective means to accomplish Whole of Government initiatives through greater inclusion of varied stakeholders across the interagency, military and NGO community.

### **Mismatch of Authorities and Capacity**

Civilian USG agencies are the executive agents in steady-state efforts, but they generally lack the capacity, expeditionary experience and, in some cases, statutory authority to lead large-scale multi-institutional, multinational efforts abroad. Resource asymmetry causes imbalances in planning and execution. The USG is drastically unbalanced with respect to military/civilian ratios (210:1 in personnel, 350:1 in budget). Military and civil authorities interact more effectively in environments that are more balanced. At JUV09, practitioners noted that those with authorities often lacked resources and capacity; those with resources and capacity lacked authorities. Resource disparities and differences in cultures often result in muddled planning and execution. Education, practice and structural reform are needed for better unity of effort.

As an example, the DOS objects to the DOD's efforts to receive authority to train foreign police. Law enforcement organizations in other parts of the world follow a colonial-style policing, while American expertise lies with the metropolitan- and community-based model throughout most U.S. police departments. DOD officials argue that the U.S. military has the skill set and resources to provide immediate security to an affected region, and should be granted police training authority (aside from U.S. Special Operations Command, which already possesses this authority). DOS officials counter that U.S. country teams, working through existing organizations such as the State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and appropriate representatives from the Justice Department and USAID, have the best tools and methods for the broader mission of security sector reform. They say that any serious discussion about improving a country's civilian law enforcement cannot occur in a vacuum – without a connected debate about establishing a legitimate judicial system.

## Assessing the Environment

There are many terms currently in use for the activity of assessing the environment – framing the problem, appreciation, assessment and design, as well as the R&S PCC-approved ICAF. A multi-faceted, comprehensive approach to

assessing a conflict is critical; this may be the interagency conflict assessment as articulated in the ICAF. It is critical to assess the conflict prior to planning, positioning the assessment to inform planning (not vice versa, with plans driving assessment). The specific details of a particular framework may or may not be significant, but the process of including broad participation in order to produce a shared understanding of the conflict and the environment must become an interagency priority.

***"We are a nation of problem solvers; this is bad if we don't know the problem."***

***– J UW09 Participant***

- **ICAF Strengths:** Participants believed that the ICAF exhibited a number of strengths during the simulation. First, the framework was viewed as being adaptable to the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Second, it could be used during the steady state and have utility as a conflict prevention tool. Third, the framework is decidedly non-military in that it requires no single organization to lead the effort, facilitating a free-flowing exchange of information and forcing organizations to think outside of their respective traditional frameworks.
- **ICAF Weaknesses:** Participants believed that ICAF did possess a number of weaknesses. First, ICAF has not yet been properly socialized throughout the military and interagency. Few participants had training in ICAF and most had no familiarity of it before the game. Second, ICAF has no backing by governmental mandate or legislation which otherwise would lend it greater credibility. Some participants were reluctant to commit to ICAF without formal legislation, despite repeated assurances that ICAF is the official conflict assessment framework of the U.S. Government. Third, ICAF neglects international partners because it is designed to focus on U.S. interagency-driven assessments. Many players called for a revision of ICAF to include multinational partners or the addition of an 'International-Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework' (IICAF).
- **ICAF Employment:** The ICAF is currently mandated in one specific instance – prior to the activation of the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS), which is intended to be a U.S. Government-wide interagency integration procedure for post-conflict responses. Although it is PCC-approved, there is little official guidance on when, whom and how the ICAF should be employed. Likewise, ICAF's linkages to existing processes – especially DOD processes – are largely unexplored.
- **Observer Effect:** It is difficult for a large, influential actor such as the United States to assess a situation without making some impact. Even a small team of U.S. military observers will affect the strategic calculus of local actors due to the possibility of U.S.

intervention. According to the “observer effect,” it is sometimes impossible to measure or observe without altering the outcome.

## **Planning Process**

The lack of common planning architectures, terminology and perspectives can feed organizational cultural anxiety among government and NGO communities. At J UW09, game play showed that planners and practitioners are often unaware of existing capabilities and capacities (i.e. knowledge and skills). This does not suggest following a formula. Host nation and NGO involvement in planning will vary as their presence may be uncertain and will depend on the presence of other departments, agencies and NGOs. However, after identification of shortfalls in collaborative planning, ideas emerged which may streamline joint planning efforts as directed by the game objectives.

An NSC-sponsored Interagency Working Group should develop and communicate complementary planning approaches to support integrated assessment and information sharing in the comprehensive and/or whole-of-government context. The USG should broaden interagency educational and experience base through exchange programs. The USG should include host nations and NGOs (when practical) in planning.

Participants also discussed the top-down, bottom-up dichotomy for assessment and planning. There was a general consensus that the bottom-up approach provided the optimal results for assessment due to the greater number of inputs from the tactical or country level. The bottom-up approach floundered during the execution phase, however, when interagency teams attempted to synthesize and integrate these inputs without assertive leadership. Top-down planning runs into resistance at the country level, where ambassadors and other field operators can resent what they perceive to be micromanagement. The key is to create a process where stakeholders in the field know their knowledge of the affected region is being leveraged and taken into serious consideration in the top-down plan.

Some J UW09 participants emphasized that a common planning methodology was not necessary as long as all parties crafted a clearly defined endstate. As one player said during a cell discussion, “As long as you define the problem together, you can plan as you go en route to the shared endstate. You probably can’t have a comprehensive planning structure, but you can have frequent forums as a substitute.”

## **Training and Education**

It is unclear if there is a central organization to establish and coordinate training for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. Game participants identified the following points of contention as joint and service shortfalls in training as per the objectives of the game. At J UW09, some viewed the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as the coordinating authority for these functions; others saw OSD Readiness and Training as the implementing office. J UW09 recommendations included the establishment of a formal training and education institution (styled after U.S. Army Training and

***“Pay now or pay later – with interest.”***  
***– J UW09 Participant***

Doctrine Command, or TRADOC) to train and educate government civilians, military, NGO, IO and coalition partner professionals. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act tied promotions to serving in a joint billet, departments and services should require participation in cross-departmental training/education and related exchange positions as a factor in the consideration for promotion.

Civilian departments would need extra capacity for training and education – essentially the equivalent of the Army’s Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students (TTHS) accounts. For example, if the State Department wanted to send some of its personnel to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, they could attend – but they are still filling an operational billet while attending CGSC. TTHS accounts and their equivalent in the other services allow military organizations to send individuals away for training while also filling that vacancy.

### **Increase US Government Coordination with NGOs**

JUW09 highlighted a number of issues in the expansion of the role of NGOs in interagency actions. First, there is a lack of trust between NGOs and USG entities – especially between NGOs and the military. NGOs generally seek to simply solve a particular problem in the affected region, while USG representatives serve the nation’s interests. NGO and USG objectives may often be diametrically opposed and they serve different masters. In a conflict prevention environment, for example, U.S. government entities seek to further U.S. interests, while NGOs typically seek to prevent a violent conflict or further the agenda and interests of the NGO. The goal of the former might not necessarily align with that of the latter. Second, there is no clarity on what role NGOs would play in this complex environment in relation to the DOD. When objectives do converge, the conflict prevention community needs to find a way to leverage the vast experience of NGO practitioners to help the DOD do its job, and vice versa. NGOs would usually be open to having their activities leveraged (but not compromised) by the U.S. military. This has often happened in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, NGOs feel compelled to keep the U.S. military at arm’s length distance to maintain perceptions of neutrality.

***"Doctrine is the refuge of the unimaginative."***

***– JUW09 Participant***

The military community also needs to acknowledge the vast range of NGOs which exist, with different missions and varying degrees of credibility, organization, scope and legitimacy. There are many groups with different agendas. They compete with each other for funding and attention, and their lack of coordination with each other, as well as their traditional friction with the military, can create uneven results.

NGOs can create unintended second- and third-order effects, just like the military. During game play, NGOs steered resources to Kenya to improve a refugee site’s crumbling infrastructure and sanitation conditions. The NGO players’ goal was to make this camp livable for its inhabitants. The Kenyan government, however, opposed intervention because it feared that the improvements would serve to attract more refugees and exacerbate problems. A well coordinated response to an affected region could possibly disregard the one opinion that matters the most – that of the host nation. The U.S. interagency and NGOs are susceptible to becoming pawns in the power struggles among a host

nation's good governance institutions – key actors in the police force and municipal governments.

Participants suggested short-, mid- and long-term solutions. In the short term, the DOD and NGOs should build on the relationships that have been built over the past several years in Afghanistan and Iraq and intensify their dialogue at all levels to form a mutual understanding of their activities. Even at the field level, where events can often overtake careful planning, DOD personnel possess the resources to find the local representative of an NGO that is operating in the area. In the midterm, NGOs should re-hire their retired practitioners to mentor the next generation of field workers. The military and diplomatic communities have benefited from retaining the services of retired generals and ambassadors. NGOs have much to gain from the experiences of practitioners who have worked for many years in some of the same places as their younger counterparts. In the long term, the USG should work to funnel resources to form habitual training and experimentation ventures – formalizing the ad hoc relationships that have developed between NGO and the multinational military community. Combatant commands already have ambassadors as political-military advisers. The addition of developmental experts from USAID and NGO experts could lead to better mission success among all parties.

## **THOUGHTS ON ZINNI AND PNSR RECOMMENDATIONS**

JUW09 directed participants to analyze two sets of recommendations that attempt to address the whole of government dilemma. Four breakout cells reviewed proposals made by Gen Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret) during speaking engagements and in his 2006 book, “Battle for Peace.” The remaining three cells examined suggestions from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), a congressionally funded, nonpartisan group formed in 2007 to examine ways to make the U.S. national security system more agile, integrated and effective. The PNSR recommendations offered an alternate perspective from suggestions that have been made by Gen Zinni, S/CRS and ICAF. Participants offered their feedback on both models.

### **Zinni**

Gen Zinni's recommendations supported major themes of JUW09, including the reform of interagency operations, a greater emphasis on “smart” power, the need for increased joint civilian-military training and planning, and the overall importance of conflict prevention in mitigate factors of violence vice merely reacting to it. In both his book and during opening remarks at the JUW09 Whole of Government Workshop in February 2009, Zinni drew from his experiences as the commander of the combined task force for Operation United Shield (the U.N. withdrawal from Somalia in 1995), as well as his time as at U.S. Central Command.<sup>3</sup> He asserted that COCOMs are often asked to perform political, economic and cultural missions more ideally suited for other USG entities.

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<sup>3</sup> Gen Zinni was CENTCOM's deputy commander from September 1996 to August 1997, then served as CENTCOM commander through September 2000 before his retirement.

Among General Zinni's recommendations:

- Enact legislation akin to the 1947 National Security Act that overhauls ad hoc practices of interagency coordination. The new construct would generally follow a military model, replacing staff sections (G-1, G-2, etc.) with representatives from relevant USG partners. The following interagency entities would be fused together at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to facilitate communication and cooperation:
  - National Monitoring Planning Center (NMPC): Monitors unstable areas around the world. Would provide viewpoints from all departments and agencies – a joint, intergovernmental team with capabilities that include intelligence processing and operational planning.
  - Joint Interagency Task Force/Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIATF/JIACG): Works with regional COCOMs oversee implementation of plans and programs developed by the NMPC and recommend programs for the NMPC to develop.
  - Interagency Field Force (IAFF): A deployable civilian capability that would join military forces in the field to handle the non-military dimensions of program implementation or post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The field force could be structured along the lines of military reserve units – experts with relevant skills would be contracted or assigned to participate in the program through the various agencies, which then activate the expert personnel for exercises, training and actual operations.
- Train military personnel alongside their U.S. and multinational interagency partners.
- Embed the State Department's regional bureau desks with the headquarters of their corresponding geographic combatant commands to create greater unity in strategic vision.

Critics have identified some problems with Gen Zinni's suggestions. For instance, the Departments of State and Defense have two distinctly different cultures of authority. In the U.S. diplomatic community, authority lies with the ambassador, who operates at the country level, while in the U.S. military it is vested at the regional level with the combatant commander. This creates a mismatch of authority with DOD operating at the regional level and State operating at the country level.

The State Department regional bureaus are designed to support the bureaucracy in Washington and have no authority on the ground. The ambassador level would be a logical choice given their presidentially mandated authority in their assigned countries, but it is unclear which ambassador would lead. One suggestion offered during JUV09 was to create a system of elevated "super ambassadors" at the regional levels that operate much like the special envoys currently in use. Critics of this approach note that this would simply create another level of bureaucracy. Ambassadors would also likely resist ceding some of their traditional authority to anyone, regardless of their title.

Meanwhile, most COCOMs are not based in their given geographic area of responsibility (with the exceptions of U.S. Northern Command and European Command, which are based in Colorado Springs, Colorado and Stuttgart, Germany, respectively). JUV09 participants

questioned the utility of drawing the regional bureaus away from Washington, where they can easily coordinate with State Department leadership and the rest of the U.S. interagency community.

Gen Zinni also suggested that the regional geographic boundaries be synchronized across departments and agencies that deal with national security. His rationale was that the different regional boundaries has stymied the U.S. government's ability to operate holistically at the regional level.

Some JUW09 participants disagreed, saying certain departments or agencies drew their boundaries to facilitate efficiency and reflect the nuances of regional politics. USCENTCOM excludes Israel to provide credibility to the combatant commander when dealing with Israel's Islamic neighbors, such as Egypt and Jordan. Similarly, players noted that USCENTCOM could not effectively deal with both Pakistan and India because of their ongoing border disputes. Likewise, it would be difficult for the State Department to provide diplomatic assistance to India without also engaging Pakistan, or be considered an honest broker in the Middle East peace process without including Israel.

### **Project on National Security Reform**

The PNSR recommendations served as an alternative lens through which some participants viewed game objectives. Though different from Gen Zinni's points, the PNSR recommendations echo some of JUW's main themes, including the implementation of a Goldwater-Nichols Act to reform U.S. interagency operations and the need for a civilian-led post-crisis surge capacity.

The requirement for a civilian surge capacity would be satisfied through the creation of an Interagency Crisis Task Force. This task force would intervene when conditions exceed the capabilities of the U.S. country team or regional team. It would be staffed by personnel throughout the U.S. interagency community with the ability to surge additional resources. The task force would provide deploying personnel with crisis response training, as well as lay the groundwork for a common civil-military handbook. This handbook would provide a shared lexicon, planning process, performance metrics and unified regional geographic classification.

What this plan neglects is the role of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). S/CRS was created with the mission of anticipating and preventing conflict worldwide. Within S/CRS, the CRC provides a similar surge capacity.

The PNSR concept provides more robust interagency education and doctrine than the current S/CRS. However, PNSR critics note that S/CRS already exists and efforts to create an additional office would be duplicative. As with the Zinni model, the PNSR suggestion of standardizing how U.S. departments and agencies organize the regional boundaries is impractical. However, the creation of a shared lexicon, doctrine and planning process fits into the existing S/CRS and CRC mandates.

## **TEAM AMERICA SYNDROME**

Dr. David Kilcullen highlighted the complexities that accompany peacekeeping and reconstruction operations, as well as the possibility that these operations may exacerbate conflict rather than mitigate it. He also cautioned against overenthusiastic American intervention in conflict prevention and noted that occasionally the best option for preventing conflict is doing nothing at all.

One situation where U.S. intervention may exacerbate conflict occurs in what Dr. Kilcullen referred to as “Team America Syndrome” (named for the 2004 big-screen comedy “Team America: World Police,” a satire of blockbuster movies, war clichés and U.S. military intervention). Military and diplomatic intervention can sometimes cause more harm than good, disregarding the local populace and exacerbating tensions among all parties.

Kilcullen also underscored the inherent risk that accompanies the deployment of civilian reconstruction personnel to crisis stricken areas. If these individuals are attacked, captured or killed, the necessary response might be military intervention.

Team America Syndrome highlights the growing need for NGOs and IOs to be leveraged by U.S. government resources. JUW09 participants said that these individuals often carry greater credibility among host nation populations than U.S. government personnel. Additionally, NGO personnel often enjoy access to areas that U.S. personnel do not. While there are limits to their participation, NGOs may present a means for the United States to intervene without adversely affecting the situation.

## **INFORMATION SHARING**

The availability and sharing of information was a key aspect of JUW09. Participants agreed that ICAFs should remain at the lowest possible level of classification possible to facilitate access throughout the USG, multinational and NGO partners. By design, ICAFs have the most utility when there is widespread participation. Exclusion of the multinational and NGO communities would limit the depth and breadth of inputs and assessments. If portions of an ICAF must be classified, these inputs can be added in later stages as annexes – leaving a majority of the assessment unclassified.

JUW09 also highlighted less than optimal information sharing arrangements between U.S. government and multinational partners. Game participants noted that information is not always shared, even with close allies. The need to incorporate multinational opinions is critical to producing a balanced, accurate portrayal of the affected region. Exclusion of close multinational allies from the assessment and planning process can trigger tensions when they attempt to execute the plan in the field.

## INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

A comprehensive approach is the inclusion of America's international partners. The feedback from the international participants was generally positive, with many players noting similar barriers to whole of government cooperation in their own countries. They said that information discovery events such as JUW09 are instrumental in overcoming these obstacles among their own interagency communities while coming to a greater understanding of how to deal with the U.S. government.


The game exposed several real world and game-specific issues. For instance, participants said that the game had a heavy focus on U.S. military processes – despite efforts to include international and non-governmental perspectives. International players also voiced problems they have experienced in combined operations with the United States. A familiar refrain was the previously discussed security clearance issue – changing the American military's “need to know” culture to embrace a “need to share.”

On the other hand, international players also identified themselves as a valuable source of funding for future conflict prevention efforts. European participants noted that their governments are more likely to fund development and reconstruction activities than military operations, and encouraged U.S. participants to leverage these multinational resource capabilities.

## KILCULLEN'S SUCCESS FACTORS

Kilcullen noted that when examining the conflict curve, it only becomes clear that a state was in a pre-conflict phase after conflict has already broken out, underscoring the importance of early warning indicators. These signs include the following:

- Presence of elitism or exclusion of a particular group in society.
- Chronic governmental capacity deficits where the local population does not receive what it expects from the government.



- Transitional movements that end with unmet expectations of peace and/or prosperity.
- Perception of endemic corruption throughout the government by the local population.

Once identified, it is important to fully understand these indicators early enough to interdict them, if necessary. If interdiction becomes necessary, options should be generated through environment-based planning, which ensures that local actors and area-specific nuances are given proper attention. More conventional, threat-based planning, meanwhile, focuses on the enemy and devotes less time to local actors and other factors such as the activities of NGOs and IOs.

A number of factors were outlined during the executive outbrief to increase the likelihood of successful conflict prevention. During the steady state, practitioners should conduct a layered assessment and risk management analysis before deepening involvement. The situation must be examined programmatically to avoid thinking in terms of an endstate. Habitual relationships must be maintained throughout these assessments with inclusive diagnoses. These long-term relationships also foster better relations while providing richer analysis through inclusion of the local populace in the assessment process.

Once a decision is made to take action, planners should follow “intelligence-led diplomacy” and/or “diplomacy-led military operations.” These two options satisfy the need internal information on the environment and the ability to reach indicators. In intelligence-led diplomacy, embassies are the best assessors of the environment. In diplomacy-led military operations, the need for the right kind of force – a strong interagency contingent, backed by special operations forces and a conventional quick-reaction capability.

## CELL RECOMMENDATIONS

During JUW09, each of the seven interdisciplinary breakout cells produced policy and organizational recommendations based on the simulation moves, plenary sessions and research question discussions. These recommendations were consolidated and presented in the final executive outbrief.

### Cell 1

- Build an interagency deployment capacity with increased flexibility, funding, and training.
- Develop interagency education programs to better facilitate a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention through interagency civil service schools, teach interagency at lowest tactical PME/junior-officer level. Mandate interagency tours as contingent for promotion and establish an interagency exchange program.
- Reconcile 5-year budget cycles with necessary 30+ year conflict prevention planning.
- Maximize the impact of NGO experience.
- Revise the definition of phase zero so DOD is not always in the lead.
- Establish unity of command, interagency doctrine and a common repository for lessons learned.

***"The military prefers rigid flexibility."***  
***– JUW09 Participant***

- Develop a multinational coordination cell at regional/operational level (below national level).

### Cell 2

- Integrate conflict prevention scenarios into national-level exercise programs and include private sector participants.
- Create a program to embed liaison officers throughout the interagency.
- Establish a senior-level working group to build consensus on conflict prevention/mitigation among appropriate public and private sector stakeholders.
- Develop education/training programs as well as an interagency reference guide to educate leaders and practitioners on the comprehensive approach. Develop a standing consultative process to include private sector (NGOs, businesses, academia).
- Work with Congress to ease interagency restrictions and provide additional authorities to conduct international activities in support of conflict prevention/mitigation. Clarify legislative and funding authorities to enable civilian agency leadership.
- Develop ICAF to include national interest considerations and host nation perspectives. Use conflict prevention assessment to clarify national interests.
- Create a process for the National Security Council to guide planning among different agencies.

### Cell 3

- Work with the existing education systems that address conflict prevention/stability and provide education for the military and interagency actors at multiple levels on roles and responsibilities.
- Increase intra-governmental exchange programs at all levels. Build formal, habitual relationships through exchange programs and combined training.
- Create a resource book to clarify acronyms, terms and variations of definitions.
- Develop focused policy and strategy with the mechanisms (e.g. robust S/CRS, linked to NSC in addition to State Department) to enact it. Develop this guidance collaboratively and within the interagency prior to promulgation.
- Leverage the NSC to monitor and enforce existing structures/procedures and provide direction to the various actors regarding their roles and responsibilities.
- Coordinate national priorities of effort with strategic objectives and communicate them throughout the interagency to increase accountability.
- Provide surge capacity, with budgetary flexibility and resources, required by civilian organizations to address nascent conflicts.

### Cell 4

- Develop and publish a common lexicon for the interagency. [Medium-term; 18 months]
- Increase professional development to foster interagency cooperation to include short-term training (computer and book-based training),

***"If you want to get someplace faster, slow down."  
– JUV09 Participant***

medium-term development (exchange programs) and long-term education (formal schooling). Publish “fundamentals of planning” which apply across the USG (such as ICAF). [Medium-term and long-term]

- Validate and test ICAF. If validated, familiarize mid-career military officers with the ICAF at staff colleges, teach senior officers the ICAF at the war colleges, teach civilian government officials and officers, and institutionalize the ICAF via the Foreign Service Institute and other institutions. [Short term; six months]
- Pass legislation to provide national security missions and funding for certain government agencies that are typically not included in the national security process (Departments of Health and Human Services, Commerce). [Medium or long-term]

### Cell 5

- Leverage local institutions, organizations and structures to facilitate a host-nation driven effort vice a U.S. government led effort.
- Pay close attention to the needs of the host nation government.
- Seek approaches that are sustainable that incorporate political, economic and military-based concepts.
- Develop common vocabulary.
- Create a non-governmental network to better facilitate the sharing of information between NGOs and USG personnel.
- Gather many perspectives for the framing, appreciation, assessment and design process before beginning detailed planning to include the USG, host nation, NGO, private volunteer organizations (PVO) and corporate representatives.
- Develop the education necessary to professionally certify “interagency planners.”

### Cell 6

- Institutionalize a common assessment tool into entry-, mid-, and executive-level leader training and use.
- Develop an “International Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework” (IICAF) to better incorporate multinational perspectives.
- Provide increased funding and utilization of integrated planning cells.
- Implement the PSNR recommendations or a similar structure.
- Create flexible financial vehicle (discretionary funds) for integrated conflict prevention.
- Enhance coordination and information sharing mechanisms for non-USG agencies.
- Create procedures for periodic reassessment and adjustment.
- Adopt PNSR Option 3, which involves shifting the management of national security issues from the National Security Council to interagency teams, starting with those considered high priorities by the President.
- Provide specialized training for potential interagency “czar.”

***“If you are afraid of the word ‘command,’ try ‘unambiguous direction.’”  
– J UW09 Participant***

### Cell 7

- Formalize an interagency regional coordinator, led by DOS/NSC.

- Reaffirm the existing NSC/IPC system under DOS lead, and enforce it to foster unified policy and strategic guidance.
- Achieve IPC approval of COCOM planning output to facilitate external coordination.
- Establish and formalize Combined Joint Interagency (CJIA) planning group to prevent interagency breakdown during times of crisis.
- Empower the regional coordinator under whom COCOM and other agencies interact to ensure the use of all elements of national power.
- Provide increased resources to the regional coordinator to allow rapid, reactive funding decisions to be made.
- Create doctrine to reinforce that doing nothing is a viable option.
- Establish an organization modeled after the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to provide interagency training and education. Expand and incentivize exchange program between the interagency and the military.

## SENIOR MENTORS' RECOMMENDATIONS

JUW09 benefited from a robust group of senior mentors. Among the group were seven retired U.S. ambassadors, five retired general officers, and numerous distinguished career veterans from inside and outside government. Their recommendations and action agencies follow:

- Treat conflict risk mitigation as a component of shaping which will modify the doctrinal intent of Phase 0 operations. (Action: DOD)
- Educate decision-makers at Planning Committee / Deputies Committee / Interagency Planning Committee level on conflict mitigation and prevention concepts and approaches. (Action: All Agencies)
- Identify conflict assessment as a specific sub-discipline of planning, and teach it at the School for Advanced Military Studies, School for Advanced Warfighting, Foreign Service Institute and relevant interagency courses. (Action: DOD and DOS)
- Familiarize military planners with embassy Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs), USAID Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) and other non-military planning approaches, including non-threat-based planning. All planners need to understand that there are many ways to plan. (Action: DOD and DOS)
- Educate U.S. country teams and COCOM staffs on the ICAF. (Action: DOD/DOS)
- Develop a concise interagency handbook based on identified success factors. (Action: International Community of Interest)
- Enable U.S. country teams to exercise interagency field authorities through a modified foreign emergency support team (FEST) augmentation during crisis response. (Action: DOS)

- Broaden the authorities for police assistance funding beyond SOCOM and 1208 authority.<sup>4</sup> (Action: Congress/DOD)
- Capture conflict risk data in an accessible form. There is a lot of data “floating” around in the USG that needs to be captured perhaps by the Center for Complex Operations (CCO), U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), or U.S. country teams (possible Project Minerva task). (Action: CCO)
- Continue to build Civilian Response Corps and S/CRS into field-capable organizations. Include conflict assessment, crisis response and risk mitigation in their task list and training. (Action: DOS)
- A joint USMC-JIWC team will be formed to create a pathway that addresses the above action items.

## **LINKAGES OF INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO CCJO AND QDR**

The recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) specifically recognizes the limitations of military power in the nation’s endeavor to achieve its aims and goals.<sup>5</sup> As noted in CCJO Chapter 1, military power is only one of several instruments from which the nation’s leadership may choose when formulating and implementing policy. Military capabilities exist to serve the political interests of the nation, and those political interests will often constrain military power. The results of J UW09 should be leveraged to improve military support to conflict prevention, in turn implementing the concept as articulated in CCJO Chapters 2 (The Joint Operating Environment), 4 (Joint Operations as the Integration and Adaptation of Combat, Security, Engagement, and Relief and Reconstruction), and 5 (Basic Categories of Military Activity).

To ensure improved military support to conflict prevention, the results of J UW09 should inform the ongoing development of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A cursory review of the larger issues suggests that the results of J UW09 could be particularly salient for Issues 1 (IW Capabilities) and 3 (Civil Support at Home and Abroad).

Both the CCJO and QDR approach topics such as conflict prevention and reconstruction from the military’s point of view, vice J UW09’s emphasis on other non-military actors. However, the assertions of the three generally complement each other. Areas of convergence include the growing importance of conflict prevention vice post-conflict reaction, the need for a standing

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<sup>4</sup> Initially known as Section 1208 of Public Law 108-375. This partner-building capacity later fell under different sections of succeeding defense authorization bills.

<sup>5</sup> The CCJO can be accessed via USJFCOM’s website: [http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact\\_ccjo.html](http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_ccjo.html).

CRC and the importance of a comprehensive approach integrating all aspects of the USG, as well as multinational allies, IOs and NGOs.

The CCJO, QDR and JUW09 all agree that the USG must be able to anticipate and mitigate conflicts before they break out. However, they disagree in what organizations should lead these efforts, as well as the role of NGOs and IOs in these operations.

In the CCJO, the ambassador and his country team serve as the primary leads for interagency coordination and engagement. The CCJO specifically notes that only the ambassador has the authority to synchronize interagency operations due to his presidentially mandated authority. Although the country-specific knowledge and expertise of NGOs and IOs are stressed, the CCJO does not integrate them in these engagements. Meanwhile, the QDR calls for the Total Force to work with non-governmental personnel as well as members of the interagency. JUW09 participants generally agreed with this portion of the QDR.

The CCJO, QDR and JUW09 also agree on the need for a developed expeditionary civilian reconstruction capability. The QDR and JUW09 assert that the DOD should not necessarily take the lead for every crisis response and reconstruction effort due to its available resources. Rather, DOS must receive greater funding to increase the capability of S/CRS and the CRC.

During post-conflict reconstruction, the CCJO states that the military should primarily serve as a transport and logistics enabler for civilian reconstruction teams. In places where conflict persists, however, the CCJO implies that the military should remain the lead coordinator on civil and reconstruction projects. This runs contrary to some opinions expressed at JUW09, where some said that S/CRS should be the lead agency in non-permissive environments as well.

## LINKS TO FY2010-2011 JOINT WARFIGHTER CHALLENGES

In addition to specific Marine Corps objectives, JUW09 addressed aspects of three Joint Warfighting Challenges (WFCs). Some of the game's findings inform the WFCs outlined below.

WFC Priority / Title	WFC Description	JUW09 Findings
<b>10 / Cyber Ops</b>	<p>The Joint Force requires the capability to conduct cyber ops in support of national objectives with emphasis on integrating &amp; synchronizing computer network attack, defense, &amp; exploitation.</p> <p>The Joint Force must be able to integrate &amp; synchronize strategic communication with other DOD &amp; interagency organizations, coalition, and allied partners to present coherent themes &amp; actions in support of deterrence, global shaping, &amp; SSTRO to support warfighter objectives.</p>	<p>There are numerous areas for improvement relating to creating a common lexicon for the interagency community, training/education, lessons-learned, and tools for coordination and integration. As in other games, JUW09 found that information sharing became a problem due to traditional organizational stovepipes and security clearance problems. A holistic approach must have a "need to share" mentality that includes MN partners, NGOs, IOs and PVOs.</p>
<b>25 / C2 Architecture #10</b>	<p>The JFC requires the capability to establish a C2 architecture that integrates joint, Service, IA &amp; MN processes, authorities, &amp; technologies for rapid &amp; flexible crisis response.</p>	<p>The U.S. country teams, and the IOs and NGOs with which they interact, offer the best inputs for assessment in a conflict prevention scenario. Other mechanisms must plug into this existing system (e.g. COCOMs, CJIATFs, other ad hoc entities) in order to achieve optimal results. Participants were impressed with the ICAF's inclusiveness and ability to incorporate non-USG partners into the assessment process. However, the game was not focused on examining ICAF fully and it generated no experimentally valid lessons from it.</p>
<b>73 / Combat, stability, &amp; reconstruction ops #9</b>	<p>The JFC requires the capability during prolonged ops to integrate combat, stability, &amp; reconstruction considerations into his overall campaign plan, ensuring conditions for transition between these overlapping &amp; interdependent phases are established &amp; coordinated w/ his joint, MN, IA, &amp; non-governmental agency partners.</p>	<p>Executive-level decision-makers throughout relevant USG agencies must be educated on conflict mitigation and prevention concepts. Military planners should become familiar with non-DOD processes (e.g. U.S. Embassy Mission Performance Plans). Threat-based planning should give way to alternate methods, such as 'counter-war' strategies.'</p> <p>With the establishment of S/CRS and CRC, the DOD can step back and support the U.S. interagency as a transport and logistics enabler instead of being the lead department.</p>

## CONCLUSION

JUW09 succeeded in bringing together hundreds of practitioners from different organizations and backgrounds throughout the USG, the international community and non-governmental arenas. The game encouraged cross-pollination of ideas and relationship-building among different organizations and cultures. This seminar-style wargame, focused on conflict prevention, was strengthened by the presence of a sizable number of participants from the NGO conflict prevention community including groups such as Alliance for Peacebuilding, Search for Common Ground and the 3D Security Initiative. The U.S. State Department, U.S. Institute of Peace, World Bank and U.N. World Food Program were also represented at the main event. This was an intangible but important first step toward building bridges between these divergent cultures and organizations.

Participants took advantage of a largely doctrine-free environment to trigger vibrant discussion about the nature of the U.S. interagency and the tools used to detect and mitigate violent conflict. ICAF played a significant role in JUW09, even though the game was not intended to validate the framework. Though few participants were fully trained on how to use ICAF, they were impressed with its potential as an effective tool at the national, regional and country levels.

JUW09 furthered the debate about the future of the U.S. interagency community, the role of NGOs and the best ways to prevent conflict. The open environment facilitated constructive debate among practitioners of the military, diplomatic and NGO worlds. Word of the game reached Capitol Hill, where a participant noted JUW09 outcomes during testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee.<sup>6</sup>

Two USG interagency working groups were briefed on JUW09's outcomes and recommendations. One was the National Security Presidential Directive 44 Working Group, convened by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC).<sup>7</sup> The other was the Conflict Prevention Working Group, hosted by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). At both of these briefings, members determined that they needed to sustain efforts to coordinate work already taking place, such as the "Interagency 101" briefs organized by the Foreign Service Institute and Joint Knowledge Online.

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<sup>6</sup> Drs. David Kilcullen, Michael Lund and Lisa Schirch testified before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee on May 7, 2009. A memo about the game was provided to the subcommittee chairman, Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wa., on May 8, 2009 by the Center for Irregular Warfare, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

<sup>7</sup> President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) on December 7, 2005. It directs the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead development, planning and coordination of USG R&S activities abroad.

These briefings pushed core concepts such as redefining a comprehensive approach of conflict prevention to include NGOs and multinational partners, the need to recognize and promote ICAF as an effective tool, and the importance of conflict prevention and conflict mitigation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century to the forefront of the policy, military and NGO communities.

Participants were exposed to concepts and took part in debates that they can take back to their respective organizations and share with their colleagues. The game opened the door to examine which of the JUV09 recommendations will be able to provide enduring, effective change to how conflict prevention is managed.

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
## **APPENDIX A**

### **Participating Organizations**

- DOD
  - U.S. Army
  - U.S. Marine Corps
  - U.S. Navy
  - U.S. Air Force
  - U.S. Coast Guard
- OSD
  - Policy
  - African Affairs
  - Readiness and Training, Policy and Programs
- Combatant Commands
  - USSOCOM
  - USJFCOM
  - USAFRICOM
- DOS
  - Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
  - Bureau of African Affairs
- U.S. Intelligence Community
  - Central Intelligence Agency
  - Defense Intelligence Agency
- U.S. Agency for International Development
  - Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
- U.S. Public Health Service
- U.N. World Food Program
- World Bank
- Think Tanks/FFRDCs
  - American Security Project
  - Center for American Progress
  - Institute for Defense Analyses
  - Institute for Defense and Business
  - U.S. Institute of Peace
- Non-profits/Academia
  - Alliance for Peacebuilding
  - Search for Common Ground
  - Easter Mennonite University/3D Security Initiative
  - Purdue University
  - University of Massachusetts, Amherst
- Multinational
  - NATO ACT
  - Afghanistan
  - Australia
  - Canada

- Denmark
- France
- Germany
- Israel
- Italy
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Singapore
- Spain
- Sweden
- United Kingdom

## APPENDIX B Simulation Table Layout



## **APPENDIX C**

### **Analysis of Simulation Interaction**

#### **Analysis Methodology**

Analysts trying to examine social networking dynamics recorded general patterns of table interaction among participants during both moves of the Whole of Government simulation. More than a dozen analysts dispersed throughout the simulation area observed specific tables or groups of tables. Players were directed to note each of their visits to another department or agency on a visitor log that was posted at each table. At the end of the simulation portion of both moves, analysts totaled the number of visits among the represented entities and examined the data for patterns of behavior.

#### **Move 1**

During Move 1 of the simulation, the players assessed the environment of the affected region – the Horn of Africa. In order to conduct their assessments, participants role-playing as members of their assigned organizations conducted business with departments or agencies as they ordinarily would in the real world. According to the data, the Department of State table received visits from 16 different organizations – the most of any entity represented during Move 1. The State Department also had 29 total visits (including repeat visits from some of the same organizations). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had visits from 10 different organizations.

The national-level entities had higher numbers of visits with each other. The Joint Staff hosted OSD and the State Department for six and five visits, respectively. The State Department, meanwhile, received five visits from OSD. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) received most of its attention from a non-governmental organization (NGO) representative – five NGO visits during Move 1.

At the regional level, the numbers of visits hosted by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJIATF-HOA) reflected the cascading orders from higher headquarters – USAFRICOM had six visits from the Joint Staff, while CJIATF-HOA received USAFRICOM six times.

At the country level, the host nations – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia – were primarily engaged by the U.S. country teams of each nation (Somalia had seven visits from its U.S. country team).

#### **Move 2**

During Move 2, participants planned their responses to the affected region. Just as during Move 1, players conducted business with other departments and agencies as they would in the real world – either visiting them at their tables or meeting with a larger group of participants for a summit at one of the six center planning tables (see Appendix B for the simulation table layout).

None of the tables received more than five visits. The State Department visited OSD five times, while USAFRICOM received five visits from the Joint Staff. A majority of the activity appeared

to shift toward the regional- and country-level entities, according to the data. Numerous participants visited USAFRICOM, CJIATF-HOA, the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and the United Nations/African Union (represented at one table due to personnel constraints).

The national-level entities that provided much of the policy guidance during Move 1 were again very active during Move 2 – State had a total of 28 visits and OSD had 19.

### **Hops and Betweenness**

The data informed analysts of the frequency of contact among agencies during the simulation. In a few cases, conclusions could be safely made about a player's interactions based on both the data and an informed understanding of the player's real-world role in a conflict prevention scenario. For instance, the data showed a greater number of visits among participants during the simulation's Move 2. Among the possible explanations:

- Participants used Move 1 to establish their social networks and were able to communicate with the right organizations more quickly and easily during Move 2. In addition to assessing the environment in the affected HOA region, the players spent Move 1 assessing how best to communicate and form an effective network.
- The game design caused greater interaction among the participants during Move 2, which was the planning phase of the simulation.
- Greater recorded network activity was a reflection of greater interaction inherent when planning is taking place.

The data also showed that the number of intervening organizations or "hops" between the originator and destination of an interaction during Move 1 interactions was five while it was three for Move 2. A possible reason for the mean decrease is that the social network became flatter – there were fewer intervening organizations and dependencies as players dealt only with organizations that they identified to be effective to achieve their objectives.

Meanwhile, regional tables including CJIATF HOA and the AU generally had high numbers of "betweenness," defined as the measure of the volume of information that is passed through organizations. The Department of State table had high betweenness numbers during both moves (65.6 during Move 1, 42.2 during Move 2) – a reflection of the State Department's central role in coordinating both assessment and planning during the simulation and in a real world conflict prevention situation.

### **Conclusion**

The data obtained from this analysis effort suggest several areas for further investigation and should not be construed as supporting conclusions to a high degree of rigor. Areas that should be further explored include how "hops" and "betweenness" can serve as a metric for process and organizational efficiency. The effort to assess the information that was captured during the game execution wrestled with an abundance of variables present in the game that ultimately took form in the data. These variables include – but are not limited to – the following:

- The physical layout of the simulation space. The simulation could realistically accommodate the 27 tables while still providing space for movement and meetings.
- The consolidation of some organizations. For instance, NGO professionals with developmental, human rights and conflict prevention backgrounds were represented at the same table as “NGOs” rather than as separate entities.
- The presence and influence of pre-dispositions to engage individual participants at one or several of the desks because of personal regard.
- A similar role of curiosity in the desk visit decision.
- The open nature of the engagement between participants which allowed for contact and discussion to take place at times and places outside of that observed for data collection.
- The presentation of information detailing the function of simulated organizations.
- The professional backgrounds of individuals manning the organizational desks (e.g. a Singaporean army officer joined two Italian army officers representing Italy during the simulation).

Social networking analysis had limited utility for this wargame due to the game’s design and pre-determined focus areas. However, the extent to which hops and betweenness can affect and reflect the effectiveness and efficiency of large organizations – particularly the U.S. interagency community and multinational task forces – should be tapped in wargames examining similar subject matter.

Simulation data for JUW09 (Move 1) Organization Visit Frequency and Ranges

Visit Legend:

0	1-2	3-4	5-6	7-9	>10
---	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

visitors	NSC	OSD	DOS	Joint Staff	S/CRS	USAID	Intel Community	AFRICOM	CJIATF HOA	DOS/IAF Bureau	Country Team - Djibouti	Country Team - Ethiopia	Country Team - Kenya	Country Team - Somalia	Australia	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	UK	UN & AU	NGOs	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia
NSC	0	2	3	2	0	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
OSD	2	0	5	6	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
DOS	2	3	0	5	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
Joint Staff	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S/CRS	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
USAID	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Intel Community	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AFRICOM	0	3	1	5	0	0	2	0	6	3	1	4	2	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	1	0
CJIATF HOA	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
DOS/IAF Bureau	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Country Team - Djibouti	0	0	1	0	0	3	2	4	4	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	2	4	0	0	0
Country Team - Ethiopia	0	0	2	0	0	3	3	2	1	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	4	0	0
Country Team - Kenya	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Country Team - Somalia	0	1	3	0	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	2	0	1	1	1	0	1	7
Australia	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	1	0	1	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
UN & AU	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	1
NGOs	0	0	1	0	0	5	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	1
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

visits =7	1	0.15%
visits =6	3	0.46%
visits =5	4	0.62%
visits =4	6	0.92%
visits =3	14	2.15%
visits =2	38	5.85%
visit =1	162	24.92%
no visit	422	64.92%
blank	26	
total cells	676	100.00%

Simulation data for JUW09 (Move 2) Organization Visit Frequency and Ranges

Visit Legend:

0	1-2	3-4	5-6	7-9	>10
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visitors	NSC	OSD	DOS	Joint Staff	S/ICRS	USAID	Intel Community	AFRICOM	CJIATF HOA	DOS/IAF Bureau	Country Team - Djibouti	Country Team - Ethiopia	Country Team - Kenya	Country Team - Somalia	Australia	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	UK	UN & AU	NGOs	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia
NSC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSD	3	0	3	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
DOS	1	5	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	3	0	2	4	3	3	1	3	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Joint Staff	1	4	3	0	0	2	1	5	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
S/ICRS	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAID	1	1	2	0	3	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Intel Community	2	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AFRICOM	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0
CJIATF HOA	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	3	2	2	4	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	0
DOS/IAF Bureau	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	2	1	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Country Team - Djibouti	0	0	3	0	1	3	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0
Country Team - Ethiopia	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	0
Country Team - Kenya	0	1	3	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Country Team - Somalia	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Australia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Canada	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	0
France	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	1
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	1
UN & AU	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	2	1
NGOs	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	1
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0

visits =7	0	0.00%
visits =6	0	0.00%
visits =5	2	0.31%
visits =4	6	0.92%
visits =3	19	2.92%
visits =2	42	6.45%
visit =1	169	25.96%
no visit	413	63.44%
blank	25	
total cells	676	100.00%

## Appendix D

### Glossary of Terms

**Africa Command (USAFRICOM):** [U.S. Africa Command](#) is one of the six regional unified Combatant Commands with an area of responsibility spanning 53 countries across the African continent, excluding Egypt.

**Central Command (USCENTCOM):** [U.S. Central Command](#) is one of the six regional unified Combatant Commands with an area of responsibility spanning Egypt, the Middle East and Central Asia.

**Center for Complex Operations (CCO):** The [Center for Complex Operations](#) is a Department of Defense-led office working in conjunction with the Department of State and USAID with the stated goal of enhancing the U.S. Government's ability to prepare for complex operations. Based at the National Defense University, the CCO combines education and training programs across the U.S. Government to foster a "whole of government" understanding, assessment and approach to complex operations through shared intellectual and decision-making frameworks.

**Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW):** The [Center for Irregular Warfare](#) is the central U.S. Marine Corps agency for identifying, coordinating and implementing irregular warfare capability development initiatives across all elements of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership/education, personnel and facilities) in order to increase, improve and enhance the Marine Corps capabilities and capacities to conduct operations across the spectrum of war against irregular threats.

**Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJITF-HOA):** For the purposes of JUV09 game play, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Horn of Africa is composed of members of all four U.S. military services, the U.S. Coast Guard, and military service personnel from France, Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Australia. [CJITF-HOA](#) was originally established at Camp Lejeune, NC in October 2002 and operated aboard the USS Mount Whitney until May 2003, when the mission transitioned to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.

*Mission Statement:* CJITF-HOA employs an "indirect approach" to counter violent extremism by conducting operations to strengthen partner nation and regional security capacity to enable long-term regional stability, prevent conflict and protect U.S. and coalition interests.

**Civilian Response Corps (CRC):** The Civilian Response Corps is a program of the [United States Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization \(S/CRS\)](#). It will be composed of federal employees and volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments, who will be trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict, in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance.

**Combatant Command (COCOM):** The Combatant Commands are United States joint military commands composed of forces from two or more services, have a broad and continuing mission,

and are separated into six geographical areas of responsibility (Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Northern Command and Southern Command) and four functional commands (Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command and Transportation Command).

**Country Teams:** A U.S. country team is composed of staff throughout the interagency and reports directly to the Ambassador. Within a given host nation, the country team is responsible for representing U.S. interests in the following areas: consular affairs, commercial/ economic/ financial affairs, agriculture and scientific matters, political/labor/defense issues, administrative support and security functions, public affairs and legal/immigration matters. For the purposes of J UW09, the Ethiopia Country Team also played the U.S. representative to the African Union.

**Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO):** The [CCJO](#) is a document produced by Joint Forces Command in conjunction with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Special Operations Command and Strategic Command. It describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision for how the joint forces circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a wide variety of security challenges. The CCJO states that future U.S. forces must be powerful, balanced, adaptable and versatile to cope with the uncertainty, complexity, unforeseeable change and persistent conflict that will characterize the future operating environment.

**Command and Control (C2):** C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces necessary to accomplish a mission. Command and control functions are performed through an array of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations.

**Department of State-Bureau of African Affairs:** The [Africa Bureau](#) is the main office overseeing African affairs and policy within the Department of State. The Africa Bureau provides the Secretary of State with policy guidance on Sub-Saharan Africa, performs in depth country analysis, coordinates with USAID to provide assistance and formulates strategies on problems facing the region such as HIV, famine and civil unrest. The Africa Bureau's ultimate priority is conflict resolution in the region.

**Goldwater-Nichols Act:** The [Goldwater-Nichols Act](#) is legislation passed in 1986 that revamped the U.S. military command structure. The law effectively streamlined the chain of command, with authority directly flowing to the combatant commander from the secretary of defense and ultimately from the President of the United States. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice the service chiefs. The CJCS was also designated as the principal military adviser to the president, NSC and secretary of defense.

**Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF):** [ICAF](#) is a framework that can be leveraged by U.S. Government personnel to foster a shared understanding of a country's conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional U.S. government efforts. This

assessment provides a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in a given country or region.

ICAF teams are situation-specific and include department/agency representatives with relevant technical or country expertise. ICAF teams are generally co-led by the Conflict Prevention division of S/CRS and USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation; those are the two USG offices with conflict assessment expertise. An ICAF allows a U.S. interagency team to identify potential entry points for future U.S. Government efforts in conflict prevention and conflict transformation, but it does not make direct recommendations for program design.

**Irregular Warfare (IW):** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.

**Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM):** [U.S. Joint Forces Command](#) is one of the four functional commands specifically tasked with leading the transformation of the U.S. military through experimentation and education.

**Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC):** The Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) was established in 2008 by Joint Forces Command to coordinate, prioritize, provide subject matter expertise and partner on all irregular warfare (IW) matters. The JIWC integrates IW activities across JFCOM directorates, Department of Defense, multinational and interagency partners for joint IW concept development and experimentation, training, doctrine and capability development to ensure joint IW capabilities meet combatant commander campaign and complex contingency requirements. Additionally, JIWC executes JFCOM's responsibilities as the DOD executive agent for joint urban operations.

**Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC):** Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is a component command of the [U.S. Special Operations Command \(USSOCOM\)](#) that comprises the [Marine Corps'](#) contribution to USSOCOM. Its core capabilities are direct action, special reconnaissance and foreign internal defense. MARSOC has also been directed to conduct counter-terrorism, information operations and unconventional warfare.

**National Security Council (NSC):** The [National Security Council \(NSC\)](#) is the President of the United States' principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The NSC's function is to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The NSC also serves as the President's primary arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the

intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

**NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC):** The NSC Principals Committee is the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues effecting national security. It is chaired by the National Security Advisor and its regular attendees include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the representative of the United States to the United Nations, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO):** NGOs are independently financed non-profit organizations that attempt to work to prevent crisis and foster civil society around the world. NGOs operate throughout HOA and there are generally four types: humanitarian (e.g. International Committee on the Red Cross), human rights (Human Rights Watch), developmental (Oxfam) and conflict resolution (Search for Common Ground).

**National Security Act of 1947:** The National Security Act of 1947 re-aligned and re-organized the U.S. Armed Forces, foreign policy, and [Intelligence Community](#) apparatus after World War II. The Act merged the [Department of War](#) and the [Department of the Navy](#) into the newly created [Department of Defense](#). The also created a separate [Department of the Air Force](#), as well as the establishment of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency.

**Phase Zero:** Phase Zero, or the shaping phase of military operations, encompasses activities prior to the beginning of Phase I, to include conflict prevention activities. Shaping operations in conflict prevention are typically non-kinetic, with an emphasis on interagency support and coordination.

**Project on National Security Reform (PNSR):** The [Project on National Security Reform](#) is a nonpartisan non-profit organization mandated by the United States Congress to recommend improvements to the U.S. national security system. PNSR is led by a 21-member bipartisan panel that includes former senior federal officials with extensive national security experience.

**Project Minerva:** Project Minerva, also known as the Minerva Initiative, is a Department of Defense-sponsored, university-based social science research initiative focusing on areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. It represents the convergence of academic social science and military operations in the battlefield. Project Minerva utilizes Human Terrain Teams, composed of scholars and military personnel, to analyze five areas including Chinese Military and Technology Studies, Iraqi and Terrorist Perspectives Projects, Religious and Ideological Studies, and New Approaches to National Security, Conflict and Cooperation.

**Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):** The [QDR](#) is the congressionally mandated main public document describing U.S. military doctrine produced by the Department of Defense. It analyzes strategic objectives, potential military threats as well as defines force structure, modernizes plans, crafts a budget plan, and is consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy.

**Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS):** [S/CRS](#) is an office within the U.S. Department of State tasked with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. S/CRS has five key concentrations: conflict prevention, planning, civilian response operations, strategic communication and resource management.

*Mission Statement:* To lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

**United States Agency for International Development (USAID):** The [United States Agency for International Development \(USAID\)](#) is an independent government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries. The types of assistance USAID provides include technical assistance and capacity building, training and scholarships, food aid and disaster relief, infrastructure reconstruction, small-enterprise loans, budget support, enterprise funds, and credit guarantees.